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1. INTRODUCTION
If we attempted to identify one area of the social sciences 
whose development in recent years has been especially 
fruitful and stimulating, it would have to be the theory of 
public choice. Advances in this theory, whose main exponent 
is the winner of the Nobel Prize for Economics James 
Buchanan, have entailed a clear improvement in knowledge 
regarding the way decisions are made in the public sector 
and the effect that these decisions have on other sectors 
operating within a market economy (1), or similarly, in the 
positive analysis of a discipline such as Public Sector 
economy in which normative theory has been the dominant 
criterion for its study up to now.
In our opinion, the fundamental contribution of the theory 
of public choice is basically its interdisciplinary visión 
of social relations, or in other words, in the 
interconnection that it proposes between the different 
methods of analysis employed by overlapping social sciences 
(2) such as Economics, Sociology and Political Science (3).
This paper intends to explore some of these interrelations. 
It specifically attempts to contrast the extent to which 
local expenditure is seen to be influenced by certain 
factors of a political nature. To this end, the second 
section shows the behaviour hypotheses that are going to
becontrasted. The third explains the method of estimation 
and the data used in the contrast, which refers to medium- 
large Spanish local authorities. A fourth section gathers
together the results of the estimate, concluding with a 
final summary.
2. THE HYPOTHESES
The starting point of our analysis is the assumption that 
in a democratically based institutional system
characterised by political pluralism and electoral 
competition, the authorities performing the functions of 
government will direct their activities toward the
fundamental objective of being reelected at the next
election (4). We also assume that a small part of the 
electorate maintains an "ideologically active militancy" 
which causes them to vote for parties with a manifestó more 
in agreement with their own ideological viewpoint and 
ignore the data obtained from their experience of the 
previous government. However, we assume that a large 
majority of the electorate, which in any case will be 
determining, do not exercise their vote for these motives, 
but follow more pragmatic criteria relative to their 
individual perception of cost and benefit derived from the 
budgetary activities of the government.
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From these premises, we assume that the party or coalition 
in power will attempt to maximise the number of votes at 
the next election, a question that can be interpreted both 
from a selfish (Downs, 1957) and "altruistic" viewpoint, 
in the sense of assuming that the number of votes received 
by the politically dominant group acts as a "proxy" of the 
function of social welfare of the collective mass, as it 
can be interpreted that decisions benefitting the majority 
of the population will be endorsed by a majority vote for 
the group in government, which implies that the objective 
of maximising social well-being would coincide with the 
objective of maximising the number of votes on the party of 
the government.
The maximisation function could therefore be defined as 
follows,
V=V(E,T) [1]
where, V represents the number of votes,
E public expenditure, as a measure of the volume and 
quality of the public services provided, and 
T the volume of tax resources.
We assume that the number of votes grows with the quantity 
and quality of public services, but at a decreasing pace, 
or
Q V Qv
0
In relation to taxation, a threshold exists beyond which an 
increase in fiscal pressure leads inevitably to a fall in 
the number of votes (6), or
d T0 / T > T0 => —  < 0
c/t
Finally, thé restriction regarding electoral "fidelity", or 
ideologically active political militancy can be defined 
thus:
V ¿  v 0
with Vo the number of "captive" votes.
Having settled on this equation, the objective of this 
paper is to explore the relevance of certain political 
factors in determining the size of the variable E (public 
expenditure).
We shall therefore analyse the logic of the policies that 
may be offered by the governing party or coalition
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focussing mainly on the variable E (positively related to 
the maximising function), without this implying a total 
rejection of the income side. In short, it deais with 
contrasting the validity or otherwise of seven hypotheses 
regarding the behaviour expected from public spending at 
local government level, which state that:
HYPOTHESIS 1: Ideology is a relevant variable. The parties 
of the left (social democrats, socialists or communists) 
are more inclined toward public intervention than those of 
the right (liberáis or conservatives), which implies that 
expected per capita expenditure under the government of a 
left wina party or coalition should be areater than that 
under a riaht wina government (7) .
HYPOTHESIS 2: Political negotiation, interchange of votes
or "logrolling" positively affects the growth of public 
expenditure. In consequence, the expected per capita 
expenditure will begreater in those places whose government 
is not backed up by a political group that has obtained an 
absolute maioritv in recent elections. The instability of 
the group in power will make it negotiate the projects to 
be approved with opposition groups, which will lead to 
greater concessions to the latter's initiatives and 
consequently higher public expenditure(8).
HYPOTHESIS 3: A population which participates a lot in the 
political process reduces the probability of the "captive" 
electorate of a party being very relevant, implying that in 
such circumstances the government would be expected to 
increase expenditure when faced with new elections. 
Therefore, local government expenditure per head is hiaher 
the greater the population7s participation in elections.
HYPOTHESIS 4: The property tax is the main source of income 
for Spanish local authorities. There also exists an 
important degree of discretion when it comes to fixing the 
rates of this tax, which moreover is a tax clearly 
noticeable by the population. In consequence, and given 
that local authorities will attempt to compénsate for 
political impopularity generated by "excessive" use of this 
tax, it is to be expected that local government per capita 
expenditure will be greater the higher the rate of tax 
applied to propertv valúes.
HYPOTHESIS 5: If we assumed in hypothesis 1 that ideology
is important when it comes to making fiscal decisions, we 
canassume that there will exist a certain 
"intergovernmental ideological solidarity" in the relevant 
fiscal relations between the different territorial levels 
of administration, in such a way that governments at 
superior levels (central and regional), will focus the 
greater part of their expenditure, and consequently the
provision of public services, in those places with
governments with whom there exists an ideological affinity, 
which would imply a fall in the level of expenditure to be 
borne by these local authorities. Therefore, local 
aoverninent per capita expenditure will be hiaher when the
"political colour1 of the local authoritv is different from
the "colour" of the central and/or regional government.
HYPOTHESIS 6: Not all local expenditure is based on
decisions taken exclusively by the government in power at 
any time. On the contrary, there exist certain items that
stem from previous agreements or that in some way represent
a "received inheritance" by the government taking over 
power, an inheritance that is particularly negative when
the previous government has become heavily in debt. If the 
new government behaves responsibly and tries to reduce the 
déficit, then local government public expenditure per 
capita will be lower the greater the burden of inherited 
financial liabilities. these liabilities being excluded 
from the measurement of expenditure. However, a vote
maximising government would have scarce incentive to behave 
responsibly in this sense.
HYPOTHESIS 7: The structure regarding sources of
financedecisively affects the araount of local expenditure. 
Specifically, we can distinguish among four large groups of 
local resources, a) individual taxes clearly perceptible by
the contributor, b) individual taxes hidden from the 
contributors, or generators of fiscal illusion, c) grants 
from higher levels of government and d) credit resources. 
The last three sources of resources can be seen as 
instruments that cause an undervaluation of the cost of 
local public services by the contributors/voters of any
particular place. In other words, the population will 
behave with a certain dégree of myopia and will therefore 
demand more public services than they would if they were 
capable of assigning the true cost to such public services. 
In consequence the total per capita expenditure of the
local government will be less the greater the proportion of 
total income represented by noticeable taxes (9) .
3. VARIABLES
In order to contrast the validity of the seven hypotheses 
the function is defined
E=E (ID,VG,EP,PT,CD,RD,FC,VT) [2]
where, E is local per capita expenditure,
ID is a "dummy" variable of an ideological nature that 
takes the valué 0 when the party or coalition in
government is of the right or centre and 1 if it is of
the left.
VG is the percentage of votes obtained by the governing 
party in the last elections held.
EP is the percentage of electoral participation in the 
last elections held in the municipality.
PT is the level of tax applied to property valúes in
the municipality.
CD is a "dummy" variable that takes the valué 0 when
ideological concordance exists between central and 
local government and 1 if the opposite is true.
RD is a "dummy" variable that takes the valué 0 when
ideological concordance exists between regional and 
local government and 1 if the opposite is true.
FC measures the financial liabilities by interest and
mortgages of outstanding debts that the local 
government must deal with annually.
VT is the percentage represented by the local 
individual taxes most visible or noticeable by the 
contributors in the total resources of the 
municipality.
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The contrast is made by the ordinary least squares method 
of the equation,
E= <Xo+$(ID+ ^VG+ 0(jEP+íXfPT+ 0(sCD+ ^RD+ # ^ 0 +  /X|VT [3] 
where the signs expected from the parameters are those
shown in Table 1 (10).
The estímate is made from a sample consisting of all
Spanish municipalities of more than 50.000 inhabitants, 
excluding the city of Madrid (pop. 3 058 182) and Barcelona 
(pop. 1.708.812), which includes a total of 105 
municipalities(11) , and is in accordance with a cross-
section analysis which takes the fiscal data from 1988
(budgets settled by the municipalities) and the electoral 
data from 1987, (year of the last local elections held in 
Spain).
Table 1
SIGNS EXPECTED FROM THE VARIABLES RELATED TO EXPENDITURE
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE EXPECTED SIGN
ID +
VG
EP +
PT +
CD +
RD +
FC -/+
VT
As dependent variables we have tested four alternatives, 
which we have called:
El= Total per capita local government expenditure.
E2= Per capita local government investment expenditure. 
E3= Total per capita local government expenditure 
excluiding financial liabilities.
E4= Total per capita local government expenditure 
excluding financial liabilities and payments made to 
personnel working for the government.
The reason for using these different alternatives is based 
on the wish to contrast our hypotheses when faced with 
different scenarios of political discretion in local
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government. Evidently the power of decisión that public 
administrators have in cases such as financial 
responsibilities derived from previously contracted 
obligations is not the same as they enjoy when proposing 
new investment. The cost of personnel in this sense would 
occupy an intermedíate position given the spanish relative 
rigidity of the spanish public labour market.
With respect to independent variables, it is necessary to 
point out that each of the proposals is related to one of 
the hypotheses to be contrasted, with the exception of the 
variables CD and RD, both connected with hypothesis 5 (12).
4. RESULTS
Table 2 shows the main results of the regressions 
performed, which allow us to find certain empirical 
evidence in most of the assumptions that supports the 
relevance of the proposed hypotheses. Indeed, variables ID, 
PT, CD and VT show the expected signs in all cases, and 
their coefficients are always significantly different from 
zero to a relatively high level of reliability, which 
allows us to verify the relevance of hypothesis 1 
(ideological factor), 4 (relative to the levels of taxation 
applied to property valúes), 5 (ideological concordance 
with the central government) and 7 (perceptibility of tax
12
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resources). Specifically, the variable VT presents the 
highest coefficient (significant to 99% in all four cases), 
which leads us to the conclusión that the growth of local 
public spending would be slowed down by increasing the tax 
responsibility of the local authorities in the sense of 
giving them greater power to establish individual taxes 
which are clearly noticeable and identifiable by the 
citizen contributor; in other words, methods of finance 
that do not involve financial illusion effects, which would 
have to be directed toward reducing the weight of 
intergovernmental transíers or grants.
RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Table 2
INDEPENDEN
VARIABLES
DEPEHDENT VARIABLES
El E2 E3 E4
CONSTANT 15.441,62
(0,952)
-5.172,82
(0,645)
15.441,62
(0,952)
7.550,35
(0,547)
ID 30.753,87
(3,183)***
12.016,42
(2,514)**
30.753,86
(3,183)***
20.623,86
(2,508)**
VG -296,54
(-3,160)***
-34,29
(0,739)
-296,54
(-3,160)***
-188,24
(-2,358)**
EP 154,01
(1,094)
156,22
(2,243)**
154,01
(1,094)
144,80
(1,209)
PT 269,04
(2,026)**
138,65
(2,111)**
269,04
(2,026)**
218,53
(1,934)**
CD 31.550,33
(3,337)***
11.477,34
(2,454)**
31.550,32
(3,337)***
19.887,32
(2,472)**
RD 1.841,93
(0,931)
506,77
(0,518)
1.841,93
(0,931)
1.624,32
(0,965)
FC 1,11
(8,621)***
-0,14
(-2,263)**
0,11
(0,829)
0,03
(0,311)
VT -496,24
(-3,583)***
-290,10
(-4,235)***
-496,24
(-3,583)***
-400,56
(-3,398)***
R2 0,596 0,237 0,287 0,213
F 17,718*** 3,726***, 4,841*** 3,253***
The figures in brackets show the valué of the statistic "t" 
*** Significant to a level of realiability of 99$
** Significant to a level of realiability of 95%
In relation to hypothesis 2 (support obtained by the 
political group in government), it is necessary to point 
out that the variable VG also shows the expected sign
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(negative) and its coefficient is significantly different 
from zero in three of the four estimates made. It only 
lacks significance, although still maintaining the correct 
sign, when we use public investment as the dependent 
variable. The behaviour of this variable is more erratic, 
or less homogenous, during time. All things considered, 
there seems to be certain empirical support for the 
existence of a degree of "logrolling" type of behaviour at 
a local level.
With respect to hypotheses 3 and 6, regarding the influence 
of electoral responsibility and inherited financial 
liabilities respectively, the results are more changeable. 
As can be seen in Table 2, the variable EP, although 
showing the expected sign, only gives statistically 
significant results when the dependent variable is 
investment. From this it can be deduced that greater 
electoral participation leads to growth in public spending, 
but confined to investment, for as it is easily visible by 
the voter it will better serve the objective of winning 
those votes uncaptured from the electorate. However, given 
the erratic nature of the investments, skepticism is 
necessary regarding the verification of hypothesis 3.
The variable FC shows a positive and strongly significant 
sign when the dependent variable is total expenditure. It 
ispositive but not significant if the dependent variables
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are E3 (total expenditure minus financial liabilities) and 
E4 (total expenditure minus financial liabilities minus 
personnel expenditure), and negative and significant when 
the dependent variable is investment. Bearing in mind the 
formulation of hypothesis 6, according to which we must 
exelude the financial liabilities themselves in the 
variable dependent chosen, we could discard the result 
obtained in the first estímate (when the variable dependent 
is El) as tautologous. As one of the principal components 
of public expenditure by local government is precisely the 
expenditure derived from debts contracted by previous 
governmnets, it is perfectly logical that the coefficient 
that affeets FC should be positive and strongly 
significant, without us being able to extract any 
implication of "public choice" from it. On the other hand, 
when financial liabilities are not included in the 
dependent variable, it would be necessary to interpret the 
results in terms of the political behaviour of the local
authorities. In this sense we see that the evidence, where 
it exists, would point towards responsibility or self-
control on the part of these authorities, as the only
significant coefficient with a reasonable degree of
reliability is the negative one (95%). With this, the 
already mentioned erratic character of local investment, 
together with the positive sign, although not significant 
of the coefficients in the other two situations, makes us 
skeptical about the implications (13).
Finally, the coefficient of the variable RD, linked with 
hypothesis 5, although giving the expected sign, does not 
give a statistically significant result. The scarce valué 
of the tstatistic for its coefficients does not allow us to 
conclude that the divergence between the "political 
colours" of regional and local governments has caused 
greater public expenditure. It could help us to understand 
the differences between the statistical significance of the 
variables CD and RD - on one side the pronounced inequality 
in the distribution of tasks amongst the distinct Spanish 
"Comunidades Autónomas" (regional governments), and, on the 
other the greater financial dependence of Spanish local 
government on central rather than regional government, this 
second case being almost nonexistent.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have tried to contrast seven hypotheses 
concerning the political behaviour of the local authorities 
in relation to public expenditure. The contrast performed 
for a sample of 105 Spanish municipalities with a 
population above 50.000 based on an analysis of regression 
by the system of ordinary least squares has allowed us to 
find empirical evidence for the following:
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- Municipalities governed by political groups of the 
left spend relatively more per head.
- Municipalities whose government is of a political 
colour different from that of the central government 
spend relatively more.
- Municipalities whose government has established hig- 
her rates of property tax spend relatively more.
- Municipalities financed to a greater extent by visi­
ble individual taxes spend relatively less.
Similarly, weak evidence has been found showing that high 
electoral participation tends to expand public spending and 
municipal self-control in relation to the inherited 
financial responsibilities. These variables are only 
significant with regard to investment spending.
NOTES
(1). Theoretical developments also exist regarding the 
mechanisms of public choice in systeras other than the 
market system, which we have not used for this paper. See, 
for example Tullock (1987), Sands (1990) and Schuknecht 
(1990).
(2). See Brennan (1984).
(3). A schematic summary of the key ideas in the theory of 
public choice can be found in Buchanan (1979). A more 
detailed analysis can be found in Mueller (1979).
(4). Note that this objective can be explained both for 
strictly selfish reasons, as assumed by the individualist 
logic of the central theoretical body of the collective 
choice theory started by Downs (1957), as for altruistic 
motives, in the sense of perceiving the ideology of the 
governing party and the functions of social utility from 
the point of view of who is governing as identical.
(5). A more detailed explanation can be found in Suárez 
Pandiello (1989).
(6) The existence of a threshold (To) beneath which an 
increase in fiscal pressure does not necessarily bring 
about a fall in electoral support could be explained in 
terms of income obtained from taxes which generate "fiscal 
illusion"; in other words, those which are not easily 
perceived by the electors. For this see Buchanan (1967).
(7) Some recent empirical studies incorpórate this argument 
by means of the use of qualitative or "dummy" variables. 
See, for example Naert (1990) and Zappan (1990).
(8) For further information on this argument see Tullock
(1976), chapter V.
(9) As empirical studies of the influence of fiscal
illusion at a local level, see Wagner (1976) and Pommerehne 
and Schneider (1978). In the Spanish case see Monasterio 
and Suárez Pandiello (1989).
(10) The ambiguity of the parameter that affects the
variable FC can be explained in terms of the dichotomy that 
we outlined previously about the ultimate implications of 
the vote maximising objective. Thus, if this objective 
tries to only satisfy the selfish interests of the 
governing group, thisgroup will not be expected to produce 
"responsible" politicians in the médium term, and therefore 
the expected sign will be positive. The opposite will be
true if we assume that a greater financial balance is more
consistent with the relevant function of social welfare, 
and it is this which relevant in the objective of 
maximising the number of votes.
(11) Of the 105 municipalities of the sample, 53 have a 
population between 50.001 and 100.000 inhabitants, 48 
between 100.001 and 500.000 and 4 between 500.001 and 
1 .000.000.
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(12) In the case that in any municipality a post- electoral 
coalition of parties is in government, the "political 
colour" assigned to that municipality will be the one which 
corresponds to the party of the mayor. This restriction 
also affects the variable VG, given that the percentage of 
votes incorporated in the estimate will be those obtained 
by the party to which the mayor belongs as president of the 
Corporation.
(13) Note that both the absolute valué of the coefficients, 
such as that of the t statistic, are kept for all the 
variables, with the obvious exception of the variable FC, 
when we eliminate the financial liabilities from the 
dependent variable.
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